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**PROPHETIC DIPLOMACY: LESSONS FROM THE TREATY OF
HUDAYBIYYAH IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Dr. Zeeshan

Post-Doctorate Fellow at Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic
University, Faisal Masjid Campus, Islamabad, Pakistan.

dr.zeeshan2021@kust.edu.pk

ABSTRACT

The Treaty of Hudaibiyyah is the watershed event of Islamic history covering elements in the realm of diplomacy, conflict resolution, and ethical statecraft. Strategic dimensions of the Treaty is discussed in this article in which Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) used principles of strategic foresight, pragmatic compromise and trust building to transition a tense standoff in favour of a pillar for peaceful coexistence. The study engages with the treaty through a combination of classical Islamic sources as well as modern international relations (IR) theory in identifying the treaty's contemporary importance for aid in mediation, faith based diplomacy, and goodwill dichotomy between moral claims and insecure pragmatic political seduction. In fact, the Hudaibiyyah model of arbitration with its focus on intermediaries, incrementality and moral consistency is proposed as an alternative paradigm to deal with the conflicts as it happens today, like Palestine, Kashmir and Sudan. In addition, it asks if Islamic principles can be reconciled with westerly frameworks in IR without a bleed of their ethical essence and the underutilization of Prophetic diplomatic ethics in Muslim majority state foreign policy. The study concludes with the call for a return to the kind of Hudaibiyyah inspired diplomacy that will lead to more effective and morally a grounded approach to global peacebuilding.

Keywords: *Hudaibiyyah Treaty, Islamic Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Prophetic Statecraft, Mediation, Soft Power, Muslim Foreign Policy, Ethical Compromise, Peacebuilding.*

Introduction

Since the earliest days of the Islamic community, diplomacy has been a founding pillar of Islamic governance, to the effect of the Qur'anic injunction to 'invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with them in a way that is

best' (16:125). Dialogue and the peaceful conflict resolution is elevated to the level of religious obligation by the Islamic tradition, and the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah is perhaps the most telling of this in action. According to Islamic jurist Muhammad Hamidullah (1945, p. 72), the Qur'an's prescription in Surah Al-Anfal (8:61) to accept peace proposals makes diplomacy a matter of strategic necessity and moral obligation. Indeed, this is unlike what we have in contemporary international relations where the realpolitik and zero sum game logic frequently shape the state behavior. Until recently, the modern discipline of international relations (Afsaruddin 2013, p. 118) has started rediscovering the importance of normative frameworks and ethical statecraft that played major roles in early Islamic diplomacy. Hudaibiyyah Agreement is a perfect example of how Islamic diplomatic tradition merges pragmatic statecraft with moral vision in a manner, which modern theorists like Nye (2004) would later develop into the conceptualization of 'soft power.' In an age of conflict fraught with elaborate conflicts in Ukraine to Gaza, the Islamic way of principled and helpful bargaining has lots of worth to offer. Success of the treaty in transforming a potential military confrontation into a basis for peaceful coexistence calls again for Prophetic diplomacy as a tool for solving today's world crises.

The Treaty of Hudaibiyyah (6 AH/628 CE) marks an important point in Islamic history that has serious lessons for dispute resolution. Ibn Ishaq's (1955, pp. 504) contemporary accounts indicate how the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) displayed the politeness to his followers that even terms that seemed unfavourable to them were accepted, return of Muslim converts to Mecca under the condition of no reciprocal action. The apparent compromise, which puzzled companions like Umar ibn al-Khattab at first, turned out to be tactically masterstroke that set the scene for Islam's quick growth throughout Arabia. The Hudaibiyyah model has remarkable antecedents in the principles of modern conflict resolution theory (especially Fischer and Ury, 1981, concept of 'principled negotiation'). It embodies the three hallmarks of Prophetic diplomacy: strategic patience (giving up short term for long term profit), pragmatic flexibility (flexibility in given circumstances but never compromising on values) and ethical consistency (sticking to promises despite other side's bad faith). As contemporary scholars like Ahmed (2018, p. 92) have pointed out, a challenge to the conventional IR paradigm, by showing that moral authority can become political influence. After the treaty, the aftermath was particularly instructive, especially when the Quraysh violated the

terms of the treaty two years on, the Muslim response was moral justification backed by strategic restraint which led to the peaceful conquest of Mecca. This historical case study provides Muslim majority states of today a template for entering international relations based upon Islamic ethical frames and the powers of power politics.

The Hudaibiyyah paradigm is more relevant to modern international relations theory and practice for its insights that fill the chasm between Western IR theories and Islamic diplomatic traditions. Constructivist scholars like Wendt (1999, p. 39) advocate on how norms and identities impact state behavior that is realized concretely in the Hudaibiyyah model's focus on trust building, and reciprocity. Success in transforming enemy relations as suggested by the treaty offers important correctives to what the realists assume about inevitable conflict in the international system characterized by anarchy. The Oslo Accords were modelled on Hudaibiyyah like principles; so were contemporary peace processes like those in Colombia. According to Kadayifci-Orellana (2007, p. 145), Islamic mediation techniques based on Prophetic tradition have exhibited effectiveness in Muslim conflict zones when they are properly adapted to contemporary settings. These challenges resonate directly with current OIC efforts that document efforts such as Organization of Islamic Conference peace missions of Sudan and Kashmir, where Western diplomatic models have proven lacking. It also provides a faith based diplomacy framework, in an era of civilizational tensions, for faith based diplomacy, in which there can be religious identity politics as well as practical coexistence. In the end, this research advocates for what I term a 'neo-Hudaibiyyah' approach to modern IR; one that integrates the ethical richness of Islamic diplomatic tradition with contemporary conflict resolution methodologies to strengthen and enlarge the record of humanity as a wiser and more effective agent of so-called 'realpolitik' provisions towards resolution of 21st century geopolitical distress.

Historical Background of the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah

The Treaty of Hudaibiyyah was made in the midst of extraordinarily complex geopolitical situation, in 6 AH/628 CE, when Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and about 1,400 unarmed Muslims were on a peaceful pilgrimage to Mecca. This was in the sacred month of Dhu al-Qi'dah, when warfare was prohibited in pre Islamic Arabia since (Armstrong, 2006, p. 209). It was the threat of the growing power of the Muslim community in Medina that prompted the Quraysh to collect their forces and block the entering of the pilgrims, so that a tense stand off took place at

Hudaybiyyah, a valley located about 9 miles from Mecca. Al-Waqidi (2005, p. 167) relates from historical accounts how the Quraysh first sent armed contingents to confront the Muslims and then resorted to negotiations. The situation was volatile, because the Meccans were afraid of losing their religious and economic dominance over the Kaaba, whereas, the Muslims manifested peaceful intentions. This struggle took place only 2 years after the Battle of the Trench (5 AH/627) when the Muslim community had repelled a Quraysh led coalition from Medina, making the Meccans cautious of any further Muslim expansion (Lings, 1983, p. 249). This was a time when the Prophet realized the strategic understanding of the Muslim community in terms of immediate circumstances and long term objectives, that's why the Prophet decided to go for a diplomatic solution and not a military confrontation.

Besides critical actors were the several parties involved in the treaty negotiations, which have in turn influenced the final agreement. In his role of both the spiritual guide and the chief negotiator, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was serving as the example for the Muslim community of dual role as the religious guide and the statesman (Ramadan, 2007, p. 132). According to al-Mubarakpuri (1996, p. 405), Suhayl ibn Amr was a skilled Meccan diplomat who was well versed in political advocacy as well as in rhetoric. Prominent companions present included Umar ibn al-Khattab and Abu Bakr of the Muslim delegation, who would come to play major roles later in Islamic historical narratives of the treaty terms. Neutral intermediaries, such as third party mediators from the Khuza'a tribe, were of particular importance to the communication between the two parties, a principle which is alive in modern diplomacy (Cohen 1990 pp.88). A second important stakeholder group, one the extent of which is reflected by the recent converts from various Arab tribes to Islam, was the broader Muslim community whose loyalty and patience had been put to the test in these negotiations. Given this diversity of such stakeholders who had their own special interests what made this a very complex negotiation dynamic that required extraordinary diplomatic skill to negotiate successfully.

Several provisions of the final agreement turned out to be asymmetrical but had deeper strategic meaning. The primary terms included: (1) A ten-year truce between the Muslims and Quraysh (Ibn Kathir, 2000, p. 183); (2) The Muslims' immediate return to Medina without performing Umrah that year, but with permission to return the following year for a three-day pilgrimage (al-Zuhayli, 2001, p. 215); (3) The controversial stipulation that any Meccan

who joined the Muslims without their guardian's permission would be returned, while Muslims who defected to Mecca would not be sent back (al-Tabari, 1987, p. 76); (4) Neutral Arab tribes could ally with either party freely. Modern legal scholars have also pointed out that these terms set up a basis for peaceful coexistence while at the same time permitting the gradual Muslim expansion through non military means (Abou El Fadl, 2014, p. 157). It was the wording of the treaty that was important, for the Prophet insisted be called 'Muhammad the Messenger of God' rather than the Qurayshi's favoured 'Muhammad ibn Abdullah' (Peters, 1994: 222).

Initial Muslim reaction to the treaty was disaffected, ranging from disappointment to anger expressed at the wisdom in taking such terms (al-Bukhari, 1997, Hadith No. 2731). Nevertheless, immediately afterwards, in Surah al-Fath 48:1, the Quranic revelation referred to the treaty as a 'manifest victory', indicating its more strategic importance (Aslan, 2011, p. 145). In practice, the treaty was advantageous to spread Islam throughout Arabia during the time of peace, as the historical records mention more conversions during the following two years than in the previous eighteen (Lings, 1983, p. 260). The Muslim conquest of Mecca in 8 AH/630 CE was morally justified on the basis that the Quraysh had violated the treaty when it attacked the Khuza'a tribe (allies of Muslims), which is also the case of beginning of Muslim Kingdom in Arabia. (Rodinson, 2002, p. 254). The geopolitical landscape of Arabia was transformed in the long term, with the establishment of Islam as the dominant political and religious force and how tactical diplomatic concessions could also further strategic purposes. Contemporary conflict resolution theorists have identified how the Hudaibiyyah model represents the concept of 'ripeness' in negotiations that are aware of the optimum time when the parties are most ready to settle (Zartman, 2001, p.12). To this day, the treaty's legacy still exerts an influence upon the Islamic approaches to diplomatic thought as a paradigm of the degree to which principle and pragmatism must be balanced in international relations.

Prophetic Diplomatic Strategy: Core Principles

1. Strategic Foresight: Choosing Peace Over War for Long-Term Benefit

The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) demonstrated exceptional strategic vision by prioritizing peace at Hudaibiyyah, even when his companions favored confrontation. This aligns with the Hadith:

عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ، عَنِ النَّبِيِّ ﷺ قَالَ: "الْمُؤْمِنُ الْقَوِيُّ خَيْرٌ وَأَحَبُّ إِلَى اللَّهِ مِنَ الْمُؤْمِنِ الضَّعِيفِ، وَفِي كُلِّ خَيْرٍ، احْرِصْ عَلَى مَا يَنْفَعُكَ، وَاسْتَعِزْ بِاللَّهِ وَلَا تَعْجزْ"

"The strong believer is better and more beloved to Allah than the weak believer, though both are good. Strive for what benefits you, seek Allah's help, and do not weaken." (Sahih Muslim, 2664)

It is this hadith that stresses the fact that "the strong believer is better and more loved to Allah than the weak believer" (Sahih Muslim 2664) to change the meaning of strength, moving away from physical power and towards strategic wisdom. This strength as Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali explains in his Jami' al-Ulum wal Hikam manifests as intellectual foresight the ability to foresee that diplomacy has greater effect than confrontation. This is the wisdom that manifests itself in the application of this principle by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) at Hudaibiyyah where he did something that was deemed disadvantageous by the Muslims on paper, but he showed remarkable strategic patience in his acceptance of seemingly disadvantageous terms. He shifted a temporary peace with God for a military victory over time and, in doing so, transformed what would otherwise have been a losing compromise into a enduring success of Islam's peaceful spread across Arabia. This is an approach which points to the fact that true leadership capability is the ability to determine the most appropriate method to attain objectives, through conflict avoidance, tactical concession, or timing; and not the other way around. The Hudaibiyyah model thus lays a veritable template for Islamic statecraft of measured restraint, coupled with an extraordinary formulation of future vision, as preferable underwriting of effective substantive, sustainable results.

2. Compromise and Pragmatism: Accepting Seemingly Unfavorable Terms

The Prophet's willingness to concede on certain terms (e.g., returning Meccan converts) initially upset his companions, yet he recognized the long-term advantage. This mirrors the Hadith:

"عَنِ ابْنِ عَبَّاسٍ، قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ﷺ: "الصُّلْحُ جَائِزٌ بَيْنَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ إِلَّا صَلَاحًا حَرَّمَ حَلَالًا أَوْ أَحَلَّ حَرَامًا"

Reconciliation is permissible among Muslims, except reconciliation that makes the lawful unlawful or the unlawful lawful." (Sunan Abu Dawud, 3594)

Islam's acceptable pragmatism in the context of divinely ordained boundaries is exemplified by the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah. Imam al-Nawawi, in his explanation in his explanation of Sharh Sahih Muslim clarifies that the concept of sulh (reconciliation), which is

regarded as a legitimate means of resolving conflict, must adhere to the core Sharia principles. This ethical pragmatism is shown by the Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) acceptance of apparently negative terms such as the return of Muslim converts to Mecca. At face value these concessions were disadvantageous, but these concessions were strategically meant for securing long term peace and creating the conditions for Islam's final victory over the world. This is an example of a profound diplomatic wisdom: temporary give and take that preserves the essential values will lead to a transformational result. The Hudaibiyyah model thus reconceptualizes strength as moral and intellectual capacity to tolerate short term setbacks for long term objectives, a mixture of idealism and realism. Thus it provides a timeless lesson to Muslim policymakers about statecraft: flexibility in means without sacrificing sacred ends, obviating tactical compromises from defeating, rather than destroying, higher ethical and spiritual goals.

3. Communication and Negotiation: Engaging Respectfully with Adversaries

The Prophet's dialogue with Quraysh's envoy, Suhayl ibn Amr, exemplified patience and respect, even amid tension. This aligns with:

"عَنْ عَائِشَةَ، قَالَتْ: "مَا خَيَّرَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ﷺ بَيْنَ أَمْرَيْنِ إِلَّا اخْتَارَ أَيْسَرَهُمَا مَا لَمْ يَكُنْ إِثْمًا"

"The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) was never given a choice between two matters but he chose the easier of them, as long as it was not sinful." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 3560)

Islam's golden mean in negotiation lies in the Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) diplomatic approach at Hudaibiyyah, between the tactical and principled adaptability. Ibn Hajar explicates in the work of Fath al-Bari that the hadith establishes a Prophetic methodology of choosing the most facilitative path (al-aysar), provided it does not violate ethical transgression. It shows in the Prophet's careful choice of wording that if he insisted on being called 'Allah's Messenger' to affirm theological truth, he also had to concede to the Quraysh's insistence on 'Muhammad ibn Abdullah' in the preamble of the document. The difference between them shows how Islam combined a sort of absolute rigidity in the realm of sacred principles (such as divine messengerhood) with a flexibility in the sphere of the procedural (such as titular conventions). These Muslims diplomats were blessed with a timeless paradigm, Hudaibiyyah model, because successful negotiation mandates distinguishing between the immutable (thawabit) and the mutable (mutaghayyirat). The

Prophet maintained the balance between form and substance and strategic concessions in the form that leads to success in substance, turning what appear to be diplomatic setbacks into the grounds for permanent success.

4. Trust-Building and Conflict De-escalation: Emphasis on Non-Violence

The treaty's 10-year truce allowed tensions to cool, reflecting the Prophetic teaching:

"عَنْ أَبِي مُوسَى الْأَشْعَرِيِّ، قَالَ: قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ ﷺ: "إِنَّ الرِّفْقَ لَا يَكُونُ فِي شَيْءٍ إِلَّا زَانَهُ، وَلَا يُنْزَعُ مِنْ شَيْءٍ إِلَّا شَانَهُ"

"Gentleness is not present in anything except that it beautifies it, and it is not removed from anything except that it disgraces it." (Sahih Muslim, 2594)

By rejecting retaliatory violence, the Prophet fostered an environment where trust could gradually replace hostility. Al-Qurtubi in *Al-Mufhim* notes this hadith establishes "rifq" (gentleness) as a transformative diplomatic tool. The Prophet's non-violent approach at Hudaibiyyah allowed hostile hearts to gradually soften - evidenced by how former enemies like Khalid ibn Walid later became Islam's greatest champions.

5. Respect for Treaties: Upholding Peace Despite Provocation

When the Quraysh violated the treaty, the Prophet responded methodically, illustrating the Hadith:

"عَنْ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ عَمْرٍو، أَنَّ النَّبِيَّ ﷺ قَالَ: "مَنْ قَتَلَ مُعَاهِدًا لَمْ يَرِخْ رَائِحَةَ الْجَنَّةِ"

"Whoever kills a person under covenant (i.e., a protected non-Muslim) will not smell the fragrance of Paradise." (Sahih al-Bukhari, 3166)

This principle reinforces that agreements even with adversaries are binding unless nullified by explicit betrayal. Ibn Taymiyyah in *Al-Sarim al-Mashul* explains this severe warning underscores the sacredness of covenants in Islam. The Prophet demonstrated this principle by meticulously fulfilling treaty terms until Quraysh's violations became undeniable, establishing that Muslims must honor agreements even with adversaries until they explicitly break them.

Applications in Contemporary International Relations

1. Mediation & Third-Party Diplomacy

The Treaty of Hudaibiyyah is a principle that the role of neutral intermediaries in conflict resolution is critical and this principle is extremely useful for present day multilateral institutions. On the other hand, the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) could adopt similar frameworks where impartial mediators collaborate with warring parties in their

dialogue and not external solutions (Zartman, 2001, p. 89). Historically, the Khuza'a tribe served as a Muslim intermediary in mediating between Muslims and Quraysh, and between Muslim and non-Muslim communities or intra-Muslim conflict situations such as those in Yemen and Sudan (Kadayifci-Orellana, 2007, p. 112). Norway's successful revival of backchannel channel including Palestine are contemporary examples to show how neutral third parties be of help in de-escalating tensions much as the Prophet (PBUH) did at Hudaibiyyah.

2. Soft Power & Ethical Leadership

Success of the treaty did not rest in military dominance but in moral credibility, which is something modern Muslim majority states should learn from in international diplomacy. Muslim countries can put a good image of themselves in the UN and OIC institutions by their adherence to the treaty since the Prophet adheres to the treaty even when they provoke him (Nye, 2004, p. 56). Particularly appropriate in protracted conflicts like Palestine and Kashmir, where long-term solutions involve a long term building of trust by engaging consistently and with principle, rather than short termish reacting aggression (Abou El Fadl, 2014, p. 203). As with the Rohingya crisis, so too should the Hudaibiyyah for that crisis would also be the combination of diplomatic pressure with humanitarian advocacy to create space for sustainable justice.

3. Conflict Zones & Practical Applications

The Hudaibiyyah model's emphasis on gradual trust-building and conditional peace offers a blueprint for modern negotiations:

- **Palestine:** A phased truce (hudna) could halt violence while allowing for political solutions, mirroring the 10-year Hudaibiyyah ceasefire.
- **Kashmir:** Neutral arbitration by bodies like the OIC, rather than unilateral impositions, could foster dialogue between India and Pakistan.
- **Sudan:** Local tribal mediators, akin to the Khuza'a, might broker ceasefires more effectively than top-down international interventions.

The treaty's legacy proves that short-term compromises can yield long-term gains—a counterpoint to the zero-sum thinking dominating contemporary geopolitics. By reviving these principles, Muslim states and global institutions can craft more nuanced, ethical approaches to today's most intractable conflicts.

Critical Reflections: Reassessing the Hudaibiyyah Model in Modern Contexts

Contemporary Muslim foreign policy often leaves realpolitik to do its thing with a Prophetic ethical framework like the Treaty of Hudaibiyyah underutilized. Today, there are many Muslim majority states that practice transactional diplomacy based on powerful blocs or the advance of narrow national interests that ignore the moral leadership of the Prophet (PBUH). For example, the OIC's lack of consistent response to crises such as Palestine or the Uyghur persecution is contrary to the principle and pragmatic character of Hudaibiyyah (Acharya, 2014, p. 78). The treaty's focus on strategic patience and moral consistency could be drawn upon by modern Muslim nations if they are in conflicts where short term alliances erode long term credibility. The roadblock is not how to reject power politics, but rather, how to imbue power politics with ethical constraints, like the Prophet's rejection of temporary advantages in justice (Hashmi 2012, p. 145). So long as Muslim states do not recalibrate, they run the risk of immuring themselves in reactive diplomacy instead of the vision statesmanship.

There are serious problems of compatibility posed by the tension between secular international relations (IR) frameworks and Islamic diplomatic principles. Often, Western IR theories tend to marginalize religious ethics, yet the Hudaibiyyah model shows how religious values can help secular diplomacy especially in the mediation and prevention of conflict (Fox & Sandler, 2004, p. 62). For instance, the treaty makes use of trust building and nonviolence, two themes favored by liberal IR along with institutions and soft power, but encourages these through divine accountability as opposed to mere utilitarianism. The implication of this synergy is that Islamic and secular approaches need not be adversarial but can, in fact, be synergistic when dealing with issues such as refugee crises and nuclear proliferation (Esposito, 2018, p. 93). The trick is to translate Prophetic ethics into universal norms acceptable to the secular systems without diminishing their moral core, which the Prophet himself achieved by maintaining pragmatic concessions grounded in transcendent principles.

The Hudaibiyyah treaty is the most instructive in balancing between the idealism and the realism, becoming a fine example of how to navigate present geopolitical complexities. Similar to the challenges that face modern Muslim states in their dealings with western powers or authoritarian regimes, the Prophet's acceptance of unfavorable terms but the preservation of nonnegotiable values (Nasr, 2009, p. 117). For example, there are other areas in which implementing the treaty's approach would be useful resource sharing along the Nile Basin or counterterrorism collaboration

securing incremental gains at the expense of ethical boundaries. However, critics of such compromises question whether that is not the normalizing of injustice but, as events in the history of Islam, proved the opposite at Hudaibiyyah by the outcome of which it was temporary restraint that enabled transformative change as Islam expanded rapidly after the treaty (Brown, 2017, p. 204). The problem for contemporary policymakers is knowing when to offer concessions for strategic aims and when to allow oppression accountability the Prophet offered who refused to tolerate oppression while simultaneously being tactically flexible.

Conclusion

The Treaty of Hudaibiyyah serves as a model of strategic diplomacy of such a high calibre that it has taught us a lot from which to learn in contemporary international relations. The longer term peace versus short term end result strategy demonstrated by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is that principled pragmatism can restructure adversarial relationships into a chance for mutual progress. Although as dated as it sounds, this model is still very relevant today, and particularly in Muslim majority states that face the intricacies of geopolitical arenas. In particular, the framework applied in the treaty to third party mediation, ethical compromise and building of trust, offer a model for solving conflicts in Palestine as well as several other Sudans, where traditional power politics failed several times. Not only is it successful, it also shows the power of soft power and moral leadership in an increasingly transactional peoples and zero sum thinking. The inclusion of Hudaibiyyah's principles might deliver more to inclusive and sustainable conflict resolution frameworks for the OIC and the UN, which are institutions that will help bridge the gap between secular diplomacy and faith-based values. This legacy forces modern policymakers struggling to match rigid approaches to negotiation with the realization that justice need not be impotent strategy and vice versa, and can be the counterpoise of prudent foresight in effective statecraft..

While the export of the Hudaibiyyah model in the current world context is premised on rethinking the conception and practice of diplomacy. Just as importantly, its lessons go beyond Muslim contexts to have universal lessons regarding the dichotomy between idealism and pragmatism alike between power and ethics. The history of a treaty is something that in the end led to a victory that compromised on the immediate but the permanent in a manner that power rarely eventually wins. For those studying and working on international relations, this ancient yet innovative approach puts pressure on the unique requirement to reconsider

unappreciated historical precedents in addressing the crises of our day. Today's leaders can reclaim this Prophetic example of Hudaybiyyah in order to grow this diplomacy onto the roots of moral clarity, strategic depth and an unflinching commitment to the common good as an urgent necessity for our world that we need peace and justice.

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