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Answering Azad, Madani, and Ambedkar: The Opposition to Pakistan and the Muslim League's Public Defense, 1940–47

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ABSTRACT

Between the Lahore Resolution of March 1940 and partition, the demand for Pakistan lived under sustained public attack from four directions: that it abandoned the Muslims of India's minority provinces; that it violated the geographical and cultural unity of India; that it portended a pan-Islamic menace, or, from the opposite flank, that it was not Islamic at all; and that the proposed state could not pay its way. This article reconstructs the critics' case in its strongest forms, from Abul Kalam Azad and the Congress, Husain Ahmad Madani and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, Maududi, the Majlis-e-Ahrar, the Punjab Unionists, and the ambivalent B. R. Ambedkar, and examines the machinery through which the All India Muslim League organized its public reply: a rebuilt party structure, student federations, the Committee of Writers and its Pakistan Literature Series, expert planning committees, and commissioned economic literature. The content of the League's replies having been documented in a companion study, the emphasis here falls on the prosecution's brief and the organized form of the defense. The article argues that the exchange was specific, public, and sustained, and that its density is direct evidence against the claim that Pakistan was insufficiently imagined.

Keywords: Pakistan Movement; Muslim League; Critics of Pakistan; Composite Nationalism; Ambedkar; Madani; Two-Nation Theory; Public Arenas

Introduction

A political demand is shaped as much by its enemies as by its friends, and the demand for Pakistan had enemies of the first quality. From the moment the All India Muslim League resolved at Lahore in March 1940 that the Muslim-majority zones of the subcontinent should constitute independent states, the demand was assailed from four directions at once: by the Indian National Congress, which held India to be one and indivisible; by the nationalist ulema of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, who condemned partition in the name of Islam itself; by the League's rivals in the Muslim street, the Ahrar and the Khaksars; and by the Unionist establishment of the very province, the Punjab, that any Pakistan would need for its heartland. To these was added the most unsettling voice of all, B. R. Ambedkar, who granted the political

logic of Pakistan while doubting aloud that it could pay its way. The seven years that followed were, among other things, a continuous public cross-examination.

This article reconstructs the prosecution's brief and the machinery of the defense, and it deliberately faces the opposite way from an earlier study. The content of the League's replies, its arguments on minorities, geography, pan-Islam, and economics as delivered by Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, the Raja of Mahmudabad, Khaliq-uz-Zaman, and the Punjab leadership, has been documented in a companion article, and that material is cited here rather than repeated.¹ What that study left in shadow is examined in the light: who the critics were, what exactly they argued, and through what organized apparatus, party machinery, student federations, commissioned pamphlets, and expert committees, the League converted individual rejoinders into a standing public defense. The two papers are designed to be read together, one recording the answers, the other the questions and the answering machine.

The stakes of the reconstruction are historiographical as well as descriptive. An influential school of scholarship, descending from Ayesha Jalal's reading of the demand as a bargaining counter, treats the idea of Pakistan as strategically vague, a claim whose vagueness was its point.² Vagueness, however, is a property that must be measured against the questions actually asked, and the questions asked between 1940 and 1947 were brutally specific: which Muslims would be abandoned, which map would be torn, which treasury would pay. A demand that survives seven years of such questioning in public, before audiences that included its bitterest enemies, has been argued, whatever else it has been. Whether it was argued well is a separate matter, and the conclusion returns to it honestly; the present concern is to establish, from the critics' side, that the argument took place.

The Answering Machine

Before the League could answer critics at scale, it had to rebuild itself, and the rebuilding was itself a kind of answer. Through the late 1930s the party adopted a new constitution with a deliberately anti-imperial accent, cut its membership fee to two annas against the Congress's four, and reorganized from the ground up: town and tehsil leagues as primary units, electing district branches, which elected the provincial leagues, which in turn constituted the All India council.³ The architecture mattered for the argument, because the standing charge against the League, pressed by Congress and Unionist alike, was that it was a drawing-room party of nawabs and barristers with no title to speak for Muslim India. A party that could produce members in the lakhs and branches in the tehsils was answering that charge structurally, before a single speech was made.

Symbols were arguments too, and the League deployed them with a lawyer's precision. At the Lucknow session of 1937 Jinnah set aside the Savile Row suit for the sherwani and cap

¹Muhammad Shafi, "Debating the Idea of Pakistan as Modern Islamic State during 1940s," *Journal of the Punjab University Historical Society* 34, no. 2 (2021): 45–60.

²Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1995).

³Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

that afterwards bore his name, a change of costume that was a change of claim: the constitutionalist of the Bombay bar presenting himself as the embodiment of a community.⁴ The Muslim student federations, above all in the Punjab, became the relay stations of the defense, carrying the case for Pakistan into colleges, districts, and election campaigns; the great sessions, processions, and public meetings of the 1940s were staged as demonstrations that the demand possessed what its critics denied it, a public. When the historian asks where the League answered its critics, the first answer is not a text but a crowd.

Print was then institutionalized, which is the surest sign that the League expected the cross-examination to continue. Between 1945 and 1947 the Committee of Writers of the All India Muslim League issued thirteen pamphlets as the Pakistan Literature Series, a standing capacity for rebuttal in print whose essays took up, subject by subject, the very objections the critics pressed: the alleged unity of India, the definition of Muslim nationhood, the economics of the proposed state.⁵ Alongside the official series, the Home Study Circle sponsored the Punjabi journalist Muhammad Sharif Toosy's twin volumes answering the case against Pakistan at book length, with a foreword contributed by Jinnah himself, a commissioning worth noting here for what it shows of organization; the volumes' economic content belongs to the companion study.⁶

The League also acquired newspapers, because a defense conducted in other men's columns is conducted on sufferance. Dawn, founded under Jinnah's patronage in 1941 and converted into a daily the following year, gave the case for Pakistan a standing English-language voice against the established nationalist press, while in Lahore the young Hameed Nizami's Nawa-i-Waqt, begun in 1940, argued the demand in Urdu to the Punjabi readership the Ahrar and the Unionists also courted.⁷ A newspaper is a daily answer: where the pamphlet replies to an objection once, the paper replies every morning, matching the critics' tempo. That the League invested in this apparatus in the very years its opponents dismissed the demand as a slogan suggests a movement preparing for a long argument, and the papers it founded to fight that argument outlived it, carrying the same quarrel into the public arenas of the state they had helped to win.

The defense even acquired a program, which is more than rebuttal strictly required. The manifesto prepared for the Punjab Muslim League's election campaign by Danyal Latifi, a young socialist lawyer, committed the party publicly to rural reform, state planning of the economy, the nationalization of key sectors, guarantees for industrial labor, progressive taxation of landholders, and the protection of minority rights.⁸ A movement content with vagueness does not put nationalization and minimum wages into an election document; it

⁴Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁵Rafique Afzal, ed., *A Case for Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1979).

⁶Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁷Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

⁸Saadia Toor, *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan* (London: Pluto Press, 2011).

promises glory and leaves the details dark. That the League's Punjab campaign of 1945–46 ran, in part, on a redistributive platform drafted by a man of the left is among the least remembered facts of the period, and it complicates every account in which the demand for Pakistan floats free of worldly commitments.

The First Objection: The Abandoned Brothers

The most wounding objection came not from the Congress but from fellow Muslims: partition, they argued, would abandon the Muslims of the minority provinces. Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress's most eminent Muslim and twice its president, put the arithmetic without mercy: the Muslims of the United Provinces, Bihar, Bombay, and Madras, the very communities whose anxieties had powered Muslim politics for a generation, would be left as a smaller, weaker minority in a Hindu-majority India shorn of the Muslim-majority provinces that had been their counterweight.⁹ On this reading Pakistan was not the rescue of Indian Islam but its partition into a state for those who needed one least and an orphanage for those who needed protection most. The objection had the special force of coming from inside the house, and the League could not dismiss it as communal malice.

Husain Ahmad Madani gave the objection its theology, and his intervention deserves more respect than partisan memory has allowed it. The principal of the seminary at Deoband and the moving spirit of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind argued in his tract on composite nationalism that a qaum, a nation, is constituted by shared homeland rather than shared faith, that Muslims and non-Muslims of India therefore formed one nation for worldly and political purposes while remaining distinct as a religious community, and that the Prophet's own compact with the non-Muslims of Medina supplied the precedent for such a common citizenship.¹⁰ From these premises the demand for Pakistan was not merely mistaken but un-Islamic, a surrender of the mission of Islam in the whole of India for a territorial consolation prize. The League thus faced, from its earliest days, a learned Islamic case against Pakistan, and every appeal it made to Islam was made under that fire.

The Muslim street held critics of a rougher grain, and the Punjab was their stronghold. The Majlis-e-Ahrar, a party of populist ulema and formidable orators born of the Punjab's agitational politics, combined anti-colonialism, sympathy for Congress, and unconcealed contempt for the League's Westernized leadership, whose credentials to speak for Islam they mocked in language that spared no person; the Khaksars of Inayatullah Mashriqi, drilling with spades in the streets of Lahore, dismissed the League from another direction again.¹¹ These movements mattered to the defense of Pakistan not because their arguments were the most sophisticated but because they contested the same audiences, the mosque congregation,

⁹Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1959).

¹⁰Husain Ahmad Madani, *Composite Nationalism and Islam (Muttahida Qaumiyat aur Islam)* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005); Ali Usman Qasmi and Megan Eaton Robb, eds., *Muslims against the Muslim League: Critiques of the Idea of Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

¹¹Samina Awan, *Political Islam in Colonial Punjab: Majlis-e-Ahrar, 1929–1949* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010).

the urban bazaar, the procession route, in which the League had to make its case. In the Punjab, the idea of Pakistan was argued against hecklers, not into silence.

The League's reply to the abandonment charge offered a mechanism, not merely an assurance, and that is its analytical interest. As the companion study documents, Jinnah argued publicly that the substantial non-Muslim minority remaining within Pakistan would guarantee reciprocal restraint between the two states, warned that Pakistan would not stand passive if Indian Muslims were mistreated, offered the minority-province Muslims the choice of citizenship where they stood or unobstructed migration, and grounded the whole in the Islamic injunction of just treatment for non-Muslims.¹² Whatever its adequacy, this was consequentialist argument on the critics' own terrain: Azad predicted consequences, and Jinnah answered with a counter-prediction and a deterrent logic. The ledger must also be honest: the mechanism failed catastrophically in the violence of 1947 and after. But the failure of a prediction is not the absence of an argument, and it is the argument, made and remade in public, that concerns the historian of the exchange.

The Second Objection: One India

The Congress objection was the oldest and the grandest: India was one, and partition was mutilation. In the Congress's public idiom the unity of India was at once geographical, the subcontinent as a single natural frame from the Himalaya to the sea; historical, a civilization elaborated over millennia; and economic, an integrated fabric of railways, rivers, and markets that no line could sever without ruin. Gandhi spoke of the division of India in the language of vivisection, and the Congress's constitutional position from 1940 to the end treated the League's demand as, at best, a bargaining posture to be bought off with safeguards and, at worst, a British-fostered secession.¹³ Composite nationalism gave the same claim its Muslim voice: if the nation was one, the Muslims were a community within it, entitled to guarantees but not to a state. Against this edifice the League had to argue not policy but ontology, the existence of its nation.

The League's counter-case moved the quarrel from sentiment to geography and definition, and it did so in print as much as on the platform. The essays of the Pakistan Literature Series took the unity claim apart region by region, arguing that the subcontinent comprised distinct natural and human units and that single geography was an optical illusion of the map; Jinnah's speeches in the same years insisted that Muslim India and Hindu India had failed, across centuries of proximity, to fuse into one nation, and that a nation, to be one, must be more than a boundary drawn by conquerors.¹⁴ The detailed content of these arguments, including the geographic essays and the leadership's public statements, is set out in the companion study and is not rehearsed here.¹⁵ What bears emphasis is the form: to the largest

¹²Shafi, "Debating the Idea of Pakistan," 50–52.

¹³Jalal, *Sole Spokesman*.

¹⁴Afzal, *A Case for Pakistan*; Jamiluddin Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, 2 vols. (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1960).

¹⁵Shafi, "Debating the Idea of Pakistan," 52–54.

and vaguest of the objections the League returned its most granular answers, maps against metaphors.

Ambedkar was the objection's most inconvenient examiner, because he cross-examined both sides. His *Thoughts on Pakistan*, published within a year of the Lahore Resolution, subjected the unity claim to a demolition more systematic than anything the League had produced, denying that history or geography any longer bound the subcontinent into one political nation, while simultaneously pressing upon the League questions its orators preferred to defer, above all the economic ones.¹⁶ Jinnah publicly commended the book to anyone confused about the Pakistan scheme, a commendation that tells the historian two things at once: that the debate over India's unity crossed communal lines, being conducted by a Dalit jurist as searchingly as by any Leaguer or Congressman, and that the League was prepared to borrow its best ammunition from outside its own camp. An idea defended with borrowed arguments is still an idea defended; it is not the behaviour of a movement indifferent to argument.

The Third Objection: The Pan-Islamic Pincer

On religion the critics attacked from both flanks at once, and the pincer deserves to be seen whole. From one side, sections of the Hindu press and Congress polemic warned that Pakistan would be the spearhead of extra-Indian Islam, a bridgehead through which the Muslim powers of the west would menace Hindustan; the demand was painted as the Khilafat agitation returned in territorial form. From the other side, the League was arraigned for the opposite crime: Maududi, founding the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941, condemned the League's project as a Muslim nationalism aping the godless nation-states of Europe, led by men without religious learning, and productive at best of a state of Muslims rather than an Islamic state; the nationalist ulema, from their different premises, agreed that the League's Islam was rhetoric.¹⁷ To be simultaneously too Islamic for one audience and not Islamic enough for another was the distinctive predicament of the defense.

Maududi's critique deserves separate statement, because it was the most systematic and the most consequential. For the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, nationalism as such, Muslim nationalism included, was a western idol, and a state founded on it would be a nation-state of Muslims, not an Islamic state; sovereignty in his scheme belonged to God, government to those trained in His law, and the League's barristers and landlords were, on both counts, unqualified custodians of the project they claimed.¹⁸ He therefore refused the demand while sharing its vocabulary, a position that confounded the League far more than open hostility, since it contested not the state but the title to define it. The sequel is well known and belongs to the companion studies: after 1947 Maududi crossed to Pakistan and campaigned relentlessly to fill with his own content the formula the League had defended. The critic of

¹⁶B. R. Ambedkar, *Thoughts on Pakistan* (Bombay: Thacker and Co., 1941).

¹⁷Sayyid Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Qasmi and Robb, *Muslims against the Muslim League*.

¹⁸Nasr, *Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution*.

the idea became the claimant of its meaning, which is perhaps the strongest evidence that the idea, by then, was worth claiming.

The League's line through the pincer was a distinction, and holding a distinction in public for seven years is itself evidence of deliberation. As the companion study records, Jinnah categorically denied the aggressive reading, ridiculing the notion that the smaller state could menace the larger, while the League openly affirmed fraternity with the Muslim world, from the Palestine resolutions to the vision of Pakistan as a base of trained men serving co-religionists abroad; solidarity was avowed, expansion denied.¹⁹ To the inverse charge the League's answer was the formula its leaders elaborated throughout the decade, the state as neither theocracy nor secular copy but a modern Islamic state, a laboratory in which Islamic principles would meet twentieth-century needs. Neither answer ended the quarrel; the point is that each answer met its objection on the objection's own ground, aggression answered with arithmetic, authenticity answered with a theory of the state.

The Fourth Objection: The Beggar State

The economic objection was the one the critics considered unanswerable, and Ambedkar stated it with the most authority. The provinces claimed for Pakistan were, on the public accounts, revenue-deficit and industrially bare; the capital, the banking, the insurance, and the advanced industry of India lay overwhelmingly in the Hindu-majority zones; and a state assembled from the subcontinent's agrarian rim would begin life, the critics concluded, as a pensioner of the neighbour it had just divorced.²⁰ Ambedkar, granting the political case, pressed the fiscal one: enthusiasm was not revenue, and the League's orators had shown no budget. Because the charge came wrapped in tables rather than slogans, it could not be answered by eloquence, and the historian can watch the League learning, across the middle 1940s, that this objection would have to be met in kind.

The Punjab supplied the objection's provincial version, and from the League's point of view the most dangerous one. The Unionist establishment that governed the province, a cross-communal bloc of the landed interest, regarded the partition of an economically integrated Punjab as ruin, and its leader Sikander Hayat Khan told the provincial assembly in 1941, in a much-noticed speech, that if Pakistan meant the domination of one community over another he would have none of it; the Punjab's Hindu and Sikh minorities, concentrated in the province's richest districts, pressed the same economic case with mounting alarm.²¹ The League thus had to argue the viability of Pakistan most strenuously in the very province Pakistan could least do without, against opponents who commanded the government, much of the press, and the canal-colony prosperity that partition would put at risk. The defense of Pakistan in the Punjab was conducted uphill, a circumstance the retrospective inevitability of 1947 has erased.

¹⁹Shafi, "Debating the Idea of Pakistan," 54–55.

²⁰Ambedkar, *Thoughts on Pakistan*.

²¹David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988); Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

The Sikhs answered the demand with a counter-demand, and the Punjab's argument thereby became triangular. A community of some six million, concentrated in the province's central districts and heavily invested in the canal-colony lands their grandfathers had broken, the Sikhs could accept neither a united Punjab inside Pakistan nor their own partition from the shrines and farms of the doabs; their leadership, with Master Tara Singh at its head, floated schemes for an Azad Punjab redrawn to deny any community a majority, and swore publicly that Pakistan would be resisted to the end.²² For the League's public defense this was the hardest audience of all, one that could not be reassured by the arithmetic of reciprocal minorities because its stake was not proportional but territorial. The tragedy of 1947 in the Punjab was prefigured in this deadlock of the platforms, where three publics argued three futures for one province and no argument reached across.

The League's reply to the statistical objection was, in the end, statistical, and institutional before it was rhetorical. In 1943 Jinnah constituted a planning committee of technical experts to establish the economic feasibility of Pakistan and survey its natural and mineral resources; the Karachi session of the same year adopted an economic program extending to industrialization, education, land reform, and labor; a broader committee of economists, engineers, and industrialists followed in 1944; and the commissioned literature, from the Literature Series essays to Toosy's volumes, carried province-by-province projections into public circulation.²³ The substance of these replies is documented in the companion study; their form is the present point. A movement that responds to a fiscal objection by appointing economists and publishing projections has conceded, correctly, that the objection deserved numbers, and has paid it the compliment of a serious answer. The projections were optimistic, as advocacy is; they were not absent, which is the claim at issue.

What the Exchange Shows

The exchange had a verdict, and it came at the polls. The elections of 1945–46 were fought, on the Muslim seats, as a referendum on Pakistan, with the whole cast of this article on the ballot in effect if not in name: the League against the nationalist ulema who toured the Punjab for the Congress's Muslim allies, against the Ahrar's orators, against the Unionist machine defending the integrated province. The League swept the Muslim seats at the centre and broke the Unionists' hold in the Punjab, a result contemporary on every side read as the public's answer to seven years of argument.²⁴ The verdict must be handled with the historian's usual care, for a franchise of the propertied is not a plebiscite, and a vote for the League bundled many motives. But the care cuts both ways: a demand that could be put to an electorate, campaigned for against learned and organized opposition, and returned with a mandate, had passed through precisely the public examination whose existence the ambiguity reading denies.

²²Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*; Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

²³Shafi, "Debating the Idea of Pakistan," 55–57; Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina*.

²⁴Jalal, *Sole Spokesman*; Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

The first property of the exchange was specificity: each objection was met on its own terrain. The abandonment charge, a prediction, was answered with a counter-prediction and a mechanism of reciprocity; the unity claim, an assertion of ontology, was answered with geography and a rival definition of nationhood; the pan-Islamic charge, a suspicion, was answered with a public distinction between fraternity and aggression; the fiscal doubt, a calculation, was answered with committees and figures. A vague idea generates vague defenses, interchangeable appeals to destiny that answer every objection equally and none particularly. The record of 1940 to 1947 shows the opposite pattern, a division of argumentative labor tracking the division of the attacks, and that pattern is the signature of a demand being thought through under pressure.

The second property was publicity, and it marks the limit of any history written from the negotiating table. The venues of the defense were the session, the student federation, the pamphlet, the election meeting, and the press, arenas in which the critics were present, hostile, and loud; the League's case was not deposited in a viceregal antechamber but shouted against the Ahrar in Punjabi towns and argued against composite nationalism before audiences the Jamiat also claimed. The high-political record on which the bargaining-counter reading rests is genuine, but it is half the archive; the other half, the public exchange, shows the same leadership expending enormous effort persuading audiences that a bargaining counter would not have needed.²⁵ Both halves are true; only together are they the history.

The third property was endurance, and it must be stated together with its limit. The idea the League defended had a long public career before 1940, as K. K. Aziz's documentation of the proposal's ancestry established, and the positions taken between 1940 and 1947 were maintained, in the founder's conduct, into the first year of the state; the critics, for their part, did not disband in 1947, but carried their questions across the frontier, where the quarrel over the state's character resumed with the same personnel on new terrain.²⁶ The limit is equally part of the record: the defense was advocacy, not prophecy, and history dealt harshly with its central predictions, above all the promise of reciprocal safety for minorities. The historiographical conclusion survives the limit. Whether the answers were right is an argument about 1947 and after; that the answers were made, severally, publicly, and for seven years, is a fact about 1940 to 1947, and it is fatal to the claim that no one had imagined what was being demanded.

Conclusion

The case for Pakistan is best read as one side of a structured public exchange, and this article has restored the other side. The critics were formidable: a Congress commanding the century's largest nationalist movement, the most learned ulema of South Asian Islam, street movements that owned the Punjab's crowds, a provincial government defending an integrated economy, and a jurist of Ambedkar's calibre keeping score. Against them the League built an answering machine, a mass party, a student network, a writers' committee, planning bodies, and a

²⁵Jalal, *Sole Spokesman*.

²⁶K. K. Aziz, *A History of the Idea of Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987).

commissioned literature, and through it returned answers whose specificity matched the questions. The quality of the critics forced the quality of the defense; in that sense the idea of Pakistan was co-produced by its enemies, and a history that omits them flatters the vagueness it means to diagnose.

The cross-examination did not end in August 1947; it changed venue and changed question. The objections of the 1940s, what is owed to minorities, what unity is worth, what Islam requires of a state, what the treasury can bear, reappeared inside the new country as the standing agenda of its public arenas, argued now among Pakistanis in the tea houses, shrines, presses, and assemblies of the Punjab, until the constitutions themselves wrote down the provisional settlements. Those postcolonial arguments are the subject of companion studies; the present one closes on the narrower finding. Between 1940 and 1947 the idea of Pakistan stood trial in public, before hostile counsel, on four counts, and it answered on all four. Whatever verdict the historian returns on the answers, the trial itself is on the record, and the record is the reply to anyone who says the idea was never argued.

Note: This article is extracted from Muhammad Shafi, "Debating the Idea of Pakistan in Public Arenas: A Case Study of the Punjab (1947–1977)" (PhD diss., Department of History, Institute of Global and Historical Studies, Government College University, Lahore), completed under the supervision of Hussain Ahmad Khan.