The All-India Sunni Conference and the Making of Pakistan: A Study of Sunni Religious Politics in Late Colonial India

Abstract

The All India Sunni Conference (AISC) remains a significantly marginalized chapter in the mainstream historiography of the South Asian freedom movement. While dominant narratives focus heavily on either secular elite-led nationalism or the anti-partition theological discourse of nationalist Deobandi ulema, the AISC provided a robust, popular, and deeply theological counter-narrative that mobilized the Sunni (primarily Barelvi/Sufi) masses of late colonial India in favor of Pakistan. This paper examines the AISC’s political trajectory through a structured three-part framework: its internal evolution and institutionalization from 1925 to 1935; its tactical response to the communal friction of the Shuddhi movement and the regional political dynamics of North India; and its conditional alliance with the All India Muslim League, culminating in the historic 1946 Banaras Conference. By examining primary sources, including the Khutbat-e-All India Sunni Conference (1946) and contemporary vernacular press, this study presents a major revision to existing scholarship: the AISC was not realistically aimed at establishing an independent, ideal theological state. Rather, its core aspiration was to act as a survivalist counterpoise to the prevailing sociopolitical currents of North India. On one side, aggressive Hindu reformist organizations threatened the Sunni mainstream in rural areas; on the other, the pro-Congress, nationalist stance of Deobandi ulema systematically undermined the political worth of the Barelvi school. Thus, the AISC's project was essentially a defensive, regional counter-strategy. When the landmark provincial elections of 1945–1946 shifted the center of gravity to the Muslim-majority provinces, the real politics of the subcontinent took a completely different trajectory. The AISC's leadership realized that while their earlier purpose of forming a mature, consolidated representative body had met with temporary success, the post-election compromises of the Muslim League made their political position untenable. The alliance was ultimately a fiasco, leaving the Barelvi mainstream marginalized in the high-stakes statecraft of the new nation-state.

Keywords: All India Sunni Conference, Two-Nation Theory, Sunni Ulema, Barelvi Movement, Venkat Dhulipala, Shuddhi Movement, Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakisan