China–United States Rivalry and Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean, 2008–2026

Abstract

The Indian Ocean has become a major competitive region in the strategic rivalry between China and the United States. Since December 2008, when the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) for the first time sent a significant force out of its area of operations, China has been battling against the US naval power in the Gulf of Aden. The paper examines the next 18 years of that rivalry, from China's anti-piracy escort missions to the building of its first overseas base in Djibouti, to the maritime dimension of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the so-called String of Pearls port network, to the United States' countervailing build-out of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the AUKUS submarine partnership and a rejuvenated Indo-Pacific basing architecture. The rivalry is analysed under the classical sea power theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, which emphasises the use of the battle fleet, a network of bases, coaling stations and protected commerce as the Mahanian instruments to dominate the Indian Ocean's critical chokeppoints and sea lines of communication. The analysis positions India as a crucial third player whose SAGAR and MAHASAGAR policies of net security provision bring balance to the bipolar tussle between Beijing and Washington. The article finishes that the Indian Ocean competition is not always violent but follows the Mahanian logic of great powers competing on the sea, and suggests policy implications for regional and extra-regional powers up to 2026 and beyond.

Keywords: China-U.S. Rivalry, Maritime Security, Indian Ocean, Sea Power, Alfred Thayer Mahan, String of Pearls, Quad, AUKUS, Strategic Chokepoints